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Introduction
Brandon was a senior in high school when he met a 14-year-old girl on a
church youth trip. With her parents’ blessing, they began to date, and
openly saw each other romantically for almost a year. When it was
disclosed that consensual sex had occurred, her parents pressed charges
against Brandon. Brandon was convicted of sexual assault and placed
2
on the sex offender registry in his state.

Enacted in 2006, Title I of the Adam Walsh Act (AWA)3 contains
a comprehensive revision of the national standards for sex offender
registration and notification.4 That Title of the AWA, the Sexual
Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), creates a new
federal crime allowing for the prosecution of individuals who fail to
register as required by SORNA.5 The failure to register crime is
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).6 Notably, § 2250(a)(2)(B) requires
that an offender convicted of a state sex offense travel in interstate
commerce before he can be subject to federal prosecution under
§ 2250(a)(2)(B).7

2. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US,
Sept. 2007, at 5, available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0907
webwcover.pdf.
3. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. §16901.
4. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 42 U.S.C.A. 16913 (West 2010).
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006) (making it a crime for anyone who "knowingly
fails to register or update a registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act").
6. See id. (making the failure to register or update sex-offender registration a crime).
7. See id. (making it a crime for anyone who "travels in interstate or foreign
commerce, or enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian country" and knowingly fails to register
or update a registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act).
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Pursuant to SORNA, if Brandon has ever traveled or will ever
travel in interstate commerce, he is subject to prosecution for the
federal crime of failure to register.8 Brandon’s travel in interstate
commerce need neither be with the intent of evading registration
requirements nor contemporaneous with his hypothetical failure to register.9
Brandon, a high school student convicted of having consensual sex with his
teenage girlfriend, will have to register in the jurisdiction in which he lives,
in the jurisdiction where he goes to school, and in the jurisdiction where he
is employed.10 If at any time Brandon fails to register, he will be subject to
up to ten years of incarceration.11 There is no requirement that the penalty
imposed for failure to register be proportional to the penalty imposed for
the original crime.12
This Note argues that § 2250(a)(2)(B) impermissibly exceeds
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. Although all circuit courts
considering this issue have upheld the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B),
a growing minority of federal district courts are striking down
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) as an impermissible exercise of congressional power.13 To
consider SORNA and its relationship with the Commerce Clause, this Note
consists of four substantive Parts.
Part I analyzes the history of sex offender registration and notification
statutes. After a brief historical overview, this Part focuses on the
Wetterling Protection and Safety Act and its presumed deficiencies. Part II
focuses on the AWA, SORNA, and 18 U.S.C. § 2250. This Part surveys
the scope of the legislation, examines the specific language of the failure to
register crime, and highlights the various constitutional issues that have
arisen.
Next, Part III provides an overview of modern Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, summarizes each of the relevant circuit court decisions, and
highlights some of the federal district courts considering this issue. Part III
exposes the varied application of Lopez, Morrison and Raich to SORNA by
8. See id. (making the failure to register or update sex-offender registration a crime).
9. See id. (stating only "travel[ing] in interstate or foreign commerce" as a condition
for prosecution, with no mention of intent to evade the registration requirement).
10. Id.
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006) (noting that whoever violates this provision "shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both").
12. Id.
13. See e.g., U.S. v. Nasci, 632 F. Supp. 2d 194, 196 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (declaring that
SORNA was not a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause).
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lower courts. Finally, this Note considers whether § 2250(a)(2)(B) is a
permissible exercise of congressional commerce powers. Notwithstanding
the presence of the jurisdictional element, Part IV concludes that
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) is inadequate to support Commerce Clause authority. In
reaching this conclusion, this Note suggests that courts should apply some
level of heightened scrutiny to Commerce Clause challenges and posits that
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) cannot be sustained under any of the three Lopez categories
of permissible regulation.
I. The History of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Statutes
A. Early State Legislation
While Title I of the AWA is new, sex offender registration and
notification laws are not.14 Although most registration laws were
promulgated in the 1990s, a few states have had registration statues for over
seventy years.15 In 1937, Florida was the first state to adopt a registration
law; the law, however, required registration only of those convicted of
felonies involving moral turpitude and living in the state’s three most
populous counties.16 In 1947, California "enacted the nation’s first
registration law of state-wide application, targeting convicted sexoffenders."17 Despite lobbying efforts, interest by state governments in
sexual offender registration statutes remained, at best, moderate—by 1989
only twelve states had implemented registration laws.18
A radical change in public policy occurred in the 1990s.19 Several
high-profile sexual assaults of children by convicted sex offenders incited
14. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. 16901.
15. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 35 ("While a few states have had sex
offender registries since the 1940s, most states began creating registries in the 1990s.").
16. See generally WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: A HISTORY OF
CRIMINAL REGISTRATION LAWS IN AMERICA (Stanford Univ. Press 2008) (providing a
general discussion on the history of state and federal sexual offender registration and
notification statutes), and Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community
Notification: Past, Present and Future, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3, 5
(2008) [hereinafter Logan, Sex Offender Registration] (discussing the history of sexual
offender registration and notification statutes).
17. Logan, Sex Offender Registration, supra note 16.
18. See id. (discussing local and state registration laws).
19. See id. ("From 1990 onward, however, public policy radically changed when a
handful of high-profile sexual assaults of children by ex-offenders inspired legislative
attention.").
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community outrage and, as a response, notification statutes rapidly swept
the country.20 Most notably, the tragic assault and murder of Megan Kanka
was the catalyst for New Jersey to enact the first notification statute aptly
named Megan’s Law.21
B. An Overview of Federal Legislation Leading up to the Adam Walsh
Act: The Wetterling Act
Shortly after New Jersey signed its registration statute into law,
President Clinton enacted the first federal offender registration law—the
Jacob Wetterling Crimes against Children and Sexual Violent Offenders
Registration Act ("Wetterling Act").22 The Wetterling Act conditioned
certain "federal law enforcement funding on the States’ adoption of sex
offender registration laws and set [] minimum standards for state
programs."23 In 1996, the Act was amended to include provisions for
community notification.24 The Wetterling Act, and its later amendments,
did not impose federal criminal liability for failure to comply with the
statutory requirements.25 According to its principal author, the purpose of
the Wetterling Act was to prod all states to enact sex offender legislation
laws and to provide for a national registration system to handle offenders
20. See id. (discussing how the sexual abuse and murder of Megan Kanka by a
convicted sex offender spawned national interested in state legislation—such legislation
became known as "Megan’s Laws"); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89 (2003)
(describing that the seven-year-old girl, Megan Kanka "was sexually assaulted and murdered
in 1994 by a neighbor who, unknown to the victim’s family, had prior convictions for sex
offenses against children").
21. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7–12 (2001) (declaring that "the public safety will be
enhanced by making information about certain sex offenders contained in the sex offender
central registry . . . available to the public through the Internet").
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006) (stating that the Attorney General shall establish
guidelines for State programs); see also Corey R. Yung, One of These Laws is Not Like the
Others: Why The Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act Raises New
Constitutional Questions, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 372 (2009) (discussing the enactment
of the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders
Registration Act).
23. Doe, 538 U.S. at 89–90.
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2) (2006) ("The State or any agency authorized by the
State shall release relevant information that is necessary to protect the public concerning a
specific person required to register under this section . . . .").
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (2006) (discussing that the failure to register under a
State program will subject the individual to "criminal penalties in any State in which the
person has so failed").
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who move from one state to another.26 Conditioned upon the receipt of
federal funding, by 1996 every state had enacted some type of sexual
offender registration legislation.27
II. The Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)
Although the Wetterling Act successfully prompted all states and the
District of Columbia to enact some type of Megan’s Law, the Act failed to
establish an effective uniform national registration system.28 Despite
various amendments to the Act, an estimated 100,000 out of 500,000
offenders remained "unregistered and their locations unknown to the public
and law enforcement."29 Additionally, "there [remained] a 200,000 person
difference between all of the state registries and the federal National Sex
Offender Registry."30 To strengthen registration and notification provisions
and to cure deficiencies of past legislation, in 2005, three separate bills
were introduced into Congress.31 The bill known as the Adam Walsh Act
soon gained bipartisan approval.32
On July 27, 2006, President Bush signed the AWA into law.33 Named
after Adam Walsh, the AWA was enacted on the twenty-fifth anniversary
of his abduction and disappearance.34 This comprehensive piece of
26. 139 CONG. REC. H10321 (1993); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at
42 ("One of the goals of the Act was to create more uniformity among state registration
schemes, to avoid some of the confusion as to registration requirements when registrants
moved to different states.").
27. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 52 (noting that all 50 states and the
District of Columbia passed their own Megan’s Laws).
28. See id. at 42 (noting that uniformity will be elusive because the "Act does not limit
the authority of states to go beyond federal law").
29. 152 CONG. REC. H5722 (2006).
30. Id. at H5726.
31. See Logan, Sex Offender Registration, supra note 16, at 6 (discussing the
enactment of three separate bills that sought to strengthen registration and notification in
various ways).
32. See id. at 6–7 (noting that the Adam Walsh Act gained approval under the
leadership of Congressman Mark Foley).
33. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. § 16901; see also
Logan, Sex Offender Registration, supra note 16, at 7 n.22 ("Under the terms of the AWA,
the Wetterling Act and other federal registration provisions will cease to be in effect either
as of July 27, 2009 or one year after the availability of computer software to be used by
states to implement the AWA, whichever is later.").
34. See Kris Axtman, Efforts to Grow to Keep Tabs on Sex Offenders, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, July 28, 2008, at 1 (noting that child advocates call the Adam Walsh
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legislation sought to "protect the public from sex offenders and offenders
against children . . . [and to] establish[] a comprehensive national system
for the registration of those offenders."35 The Act instituted sweeping
changes giving the federal government significantly more control over the
regulation of sex offenders.36
A. Overview of Title I of the Adam Walsh Act: The Sexual Offender
Registration and Notification Provision (SORNA)
SORNA, Title I of the AWA, functions as an independent and standalone piece of legislation.37 In passing SORNA, Congress sought to "close
potential gaps and loopholes under the old law, and [to] generally
strengthen the nationwide network of sex offender registration and
notification programs . . . ."38 To protect the public from sex offenders,
SORNA requires the creation of a national sex offender registry,39 makes
registration of qualifying offenders mandatory,40 creates a federal
substantive crime for failing to register,41 and retroactively applies to
offenses committed before the promulgation of SORNA.42 Although the
general effectiveness of SORNA raises legitimate questions, this Note

Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 "the most sweeping sex-offender legislation in 25
years . . . "); see also Ron Ishoy, Adam Walsh Murder Case Unsolved, But Tragedy Helped
Change U.S. Laws, MIAMI HERALD, July 28, 1991, at 1A (reporting that the abduction of
Adam Walsh from a shopping mall in Florida served as the catalyst for his father, John
Walsh, to advocate for missing children and to host the television show America’s Most
Wanted).
35. See Logan, Sex Offender Registration, supra note 16, at 7 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 16901 (2006)).
36. See Craig Albee, SORNA: What Every Wisconsin Criminal Defense Lawyer
Should Know, 16 THE WISC. DEFENDER 1, 2 (2008) (noting that the AWA established a new
national sex offender registration law (SORNA), eliminated statutes of limitations for most
offenses, created new substantive crimes, increased mandatory minimum and statutory
maximum sentences for federal crimes against children and sex crimes, and created a
national sex offender registry).
37. See Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2010)
(declaring the purpose of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act).
38. The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 72 Fed.
Reg. 30210-01 (May 30, 2007).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 16912(a) (2006).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2006).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006).
42. 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2007).
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focuses exclusively on the constitutional issues raised by the new federal
crime for failing to register as a sex offender.43
B. The New Federal Crime for a Sex Offender’s Failure to Register:
18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)
1. Analysis of Statutory Language
Distinct from the Wetterling Act, SORNA makes it a federal felony to
knowingly fail to register as a sex offender. Pursuant to the crime for
failing to register, "sex offenders are required to comply with the SORNA
registration requirements in the jurisdictions in which they reside, are
employed, or attend school as mandatory conditions of their federal
supervision . . . and may be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 if they fail
to do so."44 The statute provides:
(a) In general. —Whoever—
(1) Is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act;
(2)(A) is a sex offender as defined for the purposes of the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification and Act by reason of a conviction under
Federal law (including the Uniform Code of Military Justice), the law of

43. As a general matter, a number of factors intimate that SORNA fails to accomplish
its stated purpose of effectively promoting public safety. First, SORNA is both overinclusive and under-inclusive in scope. While the legislation imposes an overly broad
definition of "sex offender" it simultaneously fails to address many issues inextricably
intertwined with public safety. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(i) (2006) (defining a sex
offender as an individual convicted of "a criminal offense that has an element involving a
sexual act of sexual contact with another"). For example, SORNA fails to acknowledge that
family friends and acquaintances commit the vast majority of sex offenses against children.
Second, unfettered access to online databases makes it unduly burdensome for the sex
offender to re-assimilate into the community. Registry requirements make it difficult for the
offender to secure stable employment or housing and, in some circumstances, has led to
vigilante violence. See Daniel L. Feldman, The "Scarlett Letter Laws" of the 1990’s: A
Response to Critics, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1081, 1103 (1997) (stating that between seventy-five
and eighty-nine percent of sex offenses are committed by relatives and friends). Finally, the
relationship between SORNA and public safety is unknown. Very little empirical research
speaks to the effectiveness of either SORNA or previous legislation. See generally Sarah
Welchans, Megan’s Law: Evaluations of Sexual Offender Registries, 16 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y
REV. 123 (2005) (providing a literature review of the empirical evaluations of sex offender
registration and community notification policies).
44. The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 72 Fed.
Reg. 30210–01 (May 30, 2007).
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the District of Columbia, Indian tribal law, or the law of any territory or
possession of the United States; or
(B) travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or enters or leaves, or
resides in, Indian country; and
(3) knowingly fails to register or update registration as required by the
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both.45

As evidenced by § 2250(a), the failure to register crime encompasses
two distinct groups of offenders.46 Section § 2250(a)(2)(A) requires that,
regardless of interstate travel, all sex offenders convicted of federal crimes
register, and § 2250(a)(2)(B) requires that those sex offenders convicted of
state crimes register only when the individual travels in interstate
commerce.47 That said, only § 2250(a)(2)(B) contains a jurisdictional
element. While both provisions are subject to constitutional scrutiny, this
Note focuses exclusively on the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B).
Section 2250(a) imposes the stringent penalty of up to ten years
imprisonment upon individuals who knowingly fail to either register or
update their registration.48 Separate provisions contained within SORNA
delineate the requirements for who is required to register, how that
individual initially registers, and when that individual must update such
registry information.49 There is no requirement that the penalty imposed for
the failure to register be proportional to the penalty imposed for the original
crime. 50 The penalty clause of §2250(a) "can be an order of magnitude
greater than the maximum allowable for the offender’s original offense."51
Finally, although the statute’s mens rea element requires knowledge,
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006).
46. See id. (making failure to register or update sex-offender registration a crime for
both sex offenders in general and sex offenders who travel in interstate or foreign
commerce).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) (2006).
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006) (stating that those who are required and knowingly
fail to register "shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both").
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2006) (defining a sex offender as "anyone who has
committed a sex offense" and creating a three-tiered system which categorizes offenders
based upon the seriousness of their offense(s) and imposes various levels of registry
requirements).
50. See 42 U.S.C § 16913 (2006) (defining the initial registry requirements for
offenders and providing how those offenders can keep their registry current).
51. Yung, supra note 22, at 380.
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knowledge is presumed under American common law.52 Accordingly,
§ 2250(a) has been interpreted to function as a strict liability crime.53
2. Constitutional Challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B)
The constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) has been
challenged on several grounds. These challenges have been met with
relatively little success.54
First, defendants argue that Congress
unconstitutionally delegated its legislative authority to the Attorney
General and, consequently, that SORNA violates the nondelegation
doctrine.55 Second, defendants assert that SORNA violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause by increasing the punishment one received for the
commission of a sex offense that occurred before SORNA’s effective
date.56 Third, advancing several varying rationales, defendants argue that
SORNA violates the Due Process Clause.57 Finally, defendants contend
52. See id. (discussing the mens rea requirement and the presumption of knowledge of
the law).
53. See id. ("It is hard to imagine many fact patterns in which lack of knowledge is a
defense since knowledge of the law is presumed under U.S. common law.").
54. See generally Tracy Bateman Farrell, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 16902 et
seq., its Enforcement Provision, 18 U.S.C.A § 2250, and Associated Regulations, 30 A.L.R.
FED. 2d 213 (2008) [hereinafter 30 A.L.R. FED. 2d 213] (providing a collection and analysis
of cases, updated weekly, that have considered the constitutionality of SORNA).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Gould, 526 F. Supp. 2d 538 (D. Md. 2007) (holding that
SORNA does not violate the nondelegation doctrine); see generally 30 A.L.R. FED. 2d 213,
supra note 54 (providing an exhaustive list of the cases that have considered whether
SORNA violates the nondelegation doctrine). To date, no federal court considering the issue
has found that Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by giving the Attorney General
the authority to issue a ruling as to the retroactive application of SORNA. See 30 A.L.R.
FED. 2d 213, supra note 54.
56. Compare United States v. Ditomasso, 552 F. Supp. 2d 233 (D.R.I. 2008) (holding
that SORNA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause), with United States v. Gillette, 553
F. Supp. 2d 524 (D.V.I. 2008) (holding that SORNA was unconstitutional as applied to those
who traveled in interstate commerce before the effective date of SORNA). See generally 30
A.L.R. FED. 2d 213 (providing a list of the cases considering the Ex Post Facto Clause and
SORNA).
57. See United States v. Pitts, 2008 WL 474244 (M.D. La. 2007) (holding that the
defendant’s procedural due process rights were not violated on the ground that the defendant
did not have notice of SORNA’s registration requirement), and United States v. Mason, 510
F. Supp. 2d 923 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (holding that SORNA did not violate substantive due
process because the legislation was rationally related to a legitimate government interest).
But see United States v. Barnes, 2007 WL 2119895 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that the
defendant’s procedural due process rights were violated on the ground that the defendant did
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that Congress’s enactment of SORNA is an impermissible exercise of its
Commerce Clause powers.58
III. The Commerce Clause and SORNA: Supreme Court Jurisprudence
and Federal Court Treatment of Commerce Clause Challenges to SORNA
Unlike state laws, a federal law must be premised on an enumerated
power.59 Basic to the American scheme of federalism, this requirement
sought to create spheres of authority to "ensure protection of our
fundamental liberties."60 "[T]he powers delegated by the proposed
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which
are to remain in the state governments are numerous and indefinite."61 The
Constitution delegated the power to regulate interstate commerce to
Congress finds constitutional support for 18 U.S.C.
Congress.62
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) in the Commerce Clause.63
A. Modern Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: Lopez, Morrison, and Raich
The scope of congressional powers under modern Commerce Clause
jurisprudence is largely defined by three cases: United States v. Lopez,64
United States v. Morrison,65 and Gonzalez v. Raich.66 In Lopez, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, for the first time in sixty years, held that Congress, by
not have notice of SORNA’s registration requirement).
58. See infra Part III and accompanying notes and text (discussing the validity of the
Commerce Clause challenges to SORNA).
59. See James Madison, The Federalist No. 45 (1788), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS, 292–93 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961) [hereinafter The Federalist No. 45].
60. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
61. The Federalist No. 45, at 292–93.
62. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes.").
63. See e.g., CONG. REC. H5715 (daily ed. July 25, 2006) (discussing the impact of
child pornographers on interstate commerce).
64. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (affirming the Fifth Circuit and
concluding that Congress overreached the scope of the Commerce Clause).
65. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–02 (2000) (holding, per Justice
Rehnquist, that parts of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) exceeded Congress’s
Commerce Clause powers).
66. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (holding that Congress had the authority
to regulate intra-state marijuana trade, because it was an economic, albeit illegal, activity).
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passing the Gun-Free School Zones Act67 (GFSZA) had overreached the
scope of the Commerce Clause.68 The Court emphasized that Congress
failed both to make specific findings as to how the regulated activity affects
interstate commerce and to include a jurisdictional nexus between the
activity being regulated and interstate commerce.69 Five years later, the
Court again struck down non-economic, criminal legislation in United
States v. Morrison.70 Although Congress in Morrison did provide detailed
findings with regard to how gender-related crimes impacted the travel of
women, the Court found the causal relationship to be too attenuated.71
Importantly, both cases employed some level of heightened review.72 Post
Lopez and Morrison there is not much room for completely intrastate noneconomic regulation to survive judicial review.73 Lopez and Morrison
notwithstanding, in Gonzalez v. Raich, the Court upheld the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) as a permissible use of congressional commerce
authority.74 Distinguishing Lopez and Morrison, the Court characterized
the CSA as regulating "quintessentially economic activities".75 The Court
held that the CSA regulated commodities for which there was an interstate
market, albeit an illegal one.76 Affording Congress great deference, the
Court concluded that Congress had a rational basis to regulate the
67. 18 U.S.C. § 922, invalidated by United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
68. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (affirming the appellate
courts’ conclusion that the GFSZA exceeded congressional commerce authority).
69. Id. at 562.
70. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–02 (2000) (holding, per Justice
Rehnquist, that parts of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) exceeded Congress’s
Commerce Clause powers).
71. See id. at 614 (reasoning that the Government’s arguments were too attenuated and
"[i]f accepted petitioners reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as
the nationwide aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment,
transit or consumption").
72. See id. (stressing that simply because Congress sees a rational reason for
regulating a particular non-economic conduct under the Commerce Clause does not make it
permissible).
73. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (holding that Congress had the
authority to regulate intra-state marijuana trade, because it was an economic, albeit illegal,
activity).
74. See id. at 2 ("Congress’ Commerce Clause authority includes the power to prohibit
the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law.").
75. See id. at 3 ("[T]he CSA regulates quintessentially economic activities: the
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established,
and lucrative, interstate market.").
76. See id. at 18 ("[R]espondents are cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible
commodity for which there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market.").
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production and consumption of marijuana for personal, medicinal use.77
Although distinguishable from Lopez and Morrison, Raich undeniably
marks a departure from a narrow conception of the Commerce Clause.
1. United States v. Lopez: The Federalism Revolution—Part One
In the landmark opinion of United States v. Lopez, the Court held that
the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990, which made it a federal offense for
an individual to possess a firearm in a school zone, exceeded congressional
Commerce Clause authority.78 The Court first noted the overarching
federalism principles, which guided its decision to effectively narrow the
scope of congressional commerce powers.79 Respect for the "numerous and
indefinite"80 powers that are to remain with the State governments drove the
majority opinion—"[j]ust as the separation and independence of the
coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of
power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk
of tyranny and abuse from either front."81
The Court then looked to the history of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and, drawing from the structure of prior case law, laid out the
proper framework by which courts should analyze Commerce Clause
challenges: Lopez articulated three broad categories of activity that
Congress may regulate under its commerce power.82 "First, Congress may
regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce."83 Second,
Congress may "regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the
threat may come only from intrastate activities."84 "Finally, Congress’s
77. See id. at 20 ("Congress had a rational basis for concluding that leaving homeconsumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect price and market
conditions.").
78. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (affirming the Fifth Circuit
and concluding that Congress overreached the scope of the Commerce Clause).
79. See id. (highlighting that the Federal Government is one of enumerated powers,
that the enumerated powers are "few and defined," and that the powers reserved for the
states are "numerous and indefinite").
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S 452, 458 (1991)).
82. Id. at 558.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce."85
Analyzing the GFSZA under the third Lopez prong, the Court drew
guidance from prior case law sustaining regulations that ‘substantially
affected’ interstate commerce. Writing for the majority, Rehnquist drew
the distinction between economic and non-economic regulations and
concluded, "[w]here economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained."86 To
determine whether an economic activity has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, prior case law permits the effect to be viewed in the
aggregate—even if the individual instances of conduct have de minimis
impact on interstate commerce if, viewed in the aggregate, they have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, the regulation will be sustained.87
The distinction between economic and non-economic activities likely
proved outcome determinative in Lopez: because this criminal statute could
not be termed ‘economic’ or ‘commercial’ in nature, the Court held that it
could not be "sustained under the Court’s cases upholding regulations of
activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction,
which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce."88
Allowing aggregation would unduly expand the scope of federal power
such that the Court would be "hard pressed to posit any activity by an
individual that Congress is without power to regulate."89
Although the non-economic nature of the statute did not, per se, bring
the GFSZA outside of the realm of congressional commerce authority,
additional infirmities mandated the conclusion that Congress
unconstitutionally exceeded its powers.90 No one factor being dispositive,
the Court first noted that the GFSZA lacked a jurisdictional element,
"which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that
additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate
commerce."91 Second, "[n]either the statute nor its legislative history
85. Id. at 558–59.
86. Id. at 560.
87. See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (announcing and
employing the aggregation principle; in Wickard the Court aggregated individual instances
of home-grown wheat to conclude that, in the aggregate, the activity had a substantial effect
on interstate commerce).
88. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
89. Id. at 564.
90. See id. at 567–68 (concluding that Congress exceeded its powers).
91. Id. at 562.
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contain[s] express congressional findings regarding the effects upon
interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone."92 Finally, the
Court deemed too attenuated the "costs of crime" and "national
productivity" arguments advanced by the Government, which sought to
demonstrate the substantial effect that guns in school posed to interstate
commerce.93
Importantly, Lopez made no mention of the rational basis test espoused
in earlier Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The question was not whether
Congress could have rationally concluded that the guns in school,
regardless of any interstate movement, substantially affected interstate
commerce, but rather whether the sufficient nexus to interstate commerce
actually existed.94 The Lopez Court held that the GFSZA failed to fit into
any of the three broad categories of permissible congressional regulation.95
The Court concludes, "[t]o uphold the Government’s contentions here, we
would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair
to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general
police power the sort retained by the States."96
2. United States v. Morrison: The Federalism Revolution—Part Two
In United States v. Morrison, the majority struck down parts of federal
legislation regulating gender-motivated violence—a non-economic,
intrastate activity.97 The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) gave
women a private, federal cause of action for lawsuits subject to gendermotivated violence.98 When analyzing the constitutionality of the statute’s
civil remedy, the Court determined that the proper inquiry was whether the
statute substantially affected interstate commerce.99 Attempting to clarify
92. Id.
93. See id at 564 ("Under the theories that the Government presents in support of
§ 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as
criminal law enforcement of education where States have historically been sovereign.").
94. Id.
95. Id. at 568.
96. Id. at 567.
97. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–02 (2000) (affirming the Fourth
Circuit and concluding that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to enact the civil
remedy of VAWA).
98. Id. at 605.
99. Id. at 609 ("Petitioners do not contend that these cases fall within either of the first
two categories of Commerce Clause regulation. They seek to sustain § 13981 as a regulation
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Lopez’s third prong, Rehnquist outlined four factors that courts should
balance when considering whether something "substantially affects"
interstate commerce.100 A court should consider: 1) whether the activity
being regulated is commercial or economic in nature; 2) whether the statute
contains a jurisdictional element to limit its scope; 3) whether congressional
findings reflect effects upon interstate commerce; and 4) whether the nexus
or link between the activity being regulated and interstate commerce is
attenuated.101
Applying these four factors, the Court first reiterated the centrality of
the economic versus non-economic distinction to its decision in Lopez—"a
fair reading of Lopez shows that the non-economic, criminal nature of the
conduct at issue was central to our decision in that case."102 Like the
GFSZA, "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the
phrase, economic activity."103 Second, the statute at issue contained no
semblance of a jurisdictional element.104 Third, the Court looked to the
existence of legislative fact-finding and found that the statute was supported
by findings suggesting the link between gender-motivated violence and
interstate commerce.105 However, the Court emphasized that "[s]imply
because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially
affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so."106 Finally, the
Court reasoned that the arguments suggesting that gender-motivated crimes
have a substantial affect on interstate commerce were too attenuated.107
The Court reasoned, "[i]f accepted, petitioners’ reasoning would allow
Congress to regulated any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated
impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production,
transit, or consumption."108 By acknowledging the existence of legislative
findings but still striking down the statute, the Court implied that none of
the four factors were dispositive. Rather, the four factors operated as a
balancing test utilized to determine whether Congress acted within the
appropriate scope of its commerce authority.
of activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.").
100. Id. at 608–10.
101. Id. at 608–10.
102. Id. at 610.
103. Id. at 613.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 614.
106. Id. (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 615.
108. Id. at 614.
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Despite the presence of legislative findings, the Court, with ease,
struck down the statute.109 Emphasizing the non-economic, criminal nature
of the regulated activity, the Court disallowed the aggregation of individual
instances of conduct.110 The Court reasoned that the aggregation would
eviscerate traditional state police powers—crimes of gender-motivated
violence are local problems and have traditionally been addressed by local
governments.111 Again, some form of heightened judicial scrutiny was
employed—"whether particular operations affect interstate commerce
sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate
them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, can be settled
finally only by this court."112 Lopez and Morrison give teeth to the "outer
limits" of congressional commerce authority and stand for the proposition
that federal statutes, which both attempt to regulate non-commercial
activity and lack the necessary nexus between the activity being regulated
and interstate commerce, are unlikely to survive judicial scrutiny.113
3. United States v. Raich: Carving Back on the Federalism Revolution
The Court’s opinion in Raich signifies an undeniable step away
from Rehnquist’s "federalism revolution."114 In Raich, the Court
considered Congress’s power to regulate the controlled substances

109. Id. at 617.
110. See id. at 613. The Court stated:
Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity. While we need not adopt a categorical rule against
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these
cases, thus far in our Nations’ history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause
regulation only where that activity is economic in nature.
111. Id. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 ("When Congress
criminalizes conduct already denounced as criminal by the States, it effects a change in the
sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction." (internal citations
omitted)).
112. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000).
113. See, e.g., Illya Somin, Gonzalez v. Raich: Federalism as Casualty of the War on
Drugs, 15 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 507, 513 (2006) ("At the very least Morrison and
Lopez stand for the proposition that the use of aggregation to justify regulation of
‘noneconomic’ activity is strongly disfavored, even if it is not categorically forbidden.").
114. See id. at 508 ("The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gonzalez v. Raich marks a
watershed moment in the development of judicial federalism. If it has not quite put an end
to the Rehnquist Court’s ‘federalism revolution,’ it certainly represents an important step in
that direction.").

SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION ACT

501

market even when such a market was purely intrastate.115 California’s
"Compassionate Use Act of 1996" permits the limited use of marijuana
for medicinal purposes.116 In direct tension with the state regulation,
the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) expressly prohibits individuals
from "possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing cannabis for their
personal medical use."117
In upholding the CSA the Court focused its inquiry to the third
Lopez category. First, in announcing a broad definition of economics,
Raich stated, "[e]conomics refers to the production, distribution and
consumption of commodities."118 Applying this definition, the Court
characterized the CSA as "quintessentially economic" in nature119 and,
in effect, distinguished the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison. 120
At the very least, Lopez and Morrison strongly disfavored the
aggregation of non-economic instances of conduct.121
By
characterizing the statute at issue as "economic" in nature, however,
the Court was able to apply the aggregation principle utilized in
Wickard v. Filburn122—the de minimis character of the individual
instances being regulated is immaterial when the general regulatory
statute bears a substantial relation to interstate commerce.123
115. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2006) (discussing Congress’s ability to regulate
the controlled market, despite the fact that the action purely takes place in California).
116. Id. at 5.
117. Id. at 7.
181. See id. at 25–26 (utilizing the definition of "economic" from the WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966) and defining economics as the "production,
distribution and consumption of commodities").
119. Id. at 3.
120. Id.
121. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("While we do not adopt
a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to
decide these cases, thus far, in our Nation’s history out cases have upheld Commerce Clause
regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature." (citing
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–60 (1995)) (internal citations omitted)).
122. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 131 (1942). The Court held:
Where, between seed time and harvest, the Agricultural Adjustment Act was
amended so as to change the quota and penalty provisions, but the penalty
provided by the amendment for farm marketing excess is incurred . . . such facts
did not establish that the amendment was invalidly "retroactive" or that it denied
"due process of law."
Id.
123. See United States v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (stating that "when a general regulatory
statute bears a substantial relation to commerce the de minimis character of individual
instances arising under that statute is of no consequence" (citations omitted)).
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Characterizing a statute as economic in nature will often prove
outcome determinative; such a classification will not only make the
aggregation principle applicable to a finding that a regulated activity
"substantially affects" interstate commerce but also appears to allow
for greater deference to congressional fact-finding.
Lopez permits congressional regulation of a noneconomic
intrastate activity when the activity being regulated is "an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity [is]
regulated."124 Some scholars denote this as the "broader regulatory
scheme exception."125 Here, the Court finds that a "primary purpose of
the CSA is to control the supply and demand of controlled substances
in both lawful and unlawful drug markets"—a broader regulatory
scheme.126 As such, the Court reasons, "the regulation is squarely
within Congress’s commerce power because production of the
commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat [the commodity
at issue in Wickard] or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply
and demand in the national market for that commodity."127 Although
the regulation of the interstate illegal drug market is within
congressional power, the prohibition on the production of homegrown,
purely local marijuana hardly appears to be an "essential part" of the
larger regulation of an economic activity, which would be undercut but
for the regulation.128
Perhaps most notably, the Court accorded more deference to
congressional fact-finding in Raich than it did in either Lopez or
Morrison. The Court stated: "[i]n assessing the scope of Congress’s
authority under the Commerce Clause, we stress that the task before us
is a modest one. We need not determine whether respondents’
activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate
commerce, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so

124. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
125. See generally Somin, supra note 113, at 50 (discussing congressional regulation of
noneconomic intrastate activity).
126. Raich, 545 U.S. at 19.
127. Id.
128. See Somin, supra note 113, at 50 (suggesting that the Court in Raich, "completely
ignored Lopez’s statement that the broad regulatory scheme exception applies only in cases
where inclusion of the noneconomic activity is ‘essential’ to the enforcement of the
regulatory framework").
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concluding."129 By re-introducing the rational basis test to Commerce
Clause challenges, the Court undeniably expands the Congress’s
powers under the Commerce Clause.
B. Appellate Court Treatment of Commerce Clause Challenges to SORNA
As of March 29, 2009, four Circuits have considered Commerce
Clause challenges to SORNA.130 The Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits have all rejected defendants’ arguments.131 Although all of the
circuit courts have upheld the constitutionality of SORNA, the rationales
employed by the various circuits are inconsistent.132 As demonstrated by
these four opinions, the proper application of Raich to subsequent
Commerce Clause challenges is unclear.
1. Seventh Circuit Treatment: United States v. Dixon
In United States v. Dixon,133 the Seventh Circuit disposed of the
defendant’s Commerce Clause argument in two sentences.134 The court’s
opinion made no mention of Lopez, Morrison, or Raich. Judge Posner
reasoned that § 2250(a)(2)(B) fit into the second Lopez category—that
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) regulates the "instrumentalities of interstate commerce or
persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come
only from intrastate activities."135
Judge Posner then relied on the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421, to dispel
the defendant’s argument that "the movement of a person as distinct from a
thing across state lines is not ‘commerce’ within the meaning of the
Constitution’s Commerce Clause."136 The Seventh Circuit found that
because the Mann Act, like § 2250(a)(2)(B), regulates "persons" rather than
"things" in interstate commerce, § 2250(a)(2)(B) must be permissible under

129. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (citations omitted).
130. See infra Part III.B (discussing the varying rationales used by the circuit courts to
uphold SORNA).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. United States v. Dixon, 551 F. 3d 578 (7th Cir. 2008).
134. See id. at 584 (finding Dixon’s Commerce Clause arguments to be without merit).
135. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995).
136. Id.
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the second Lopez category.137 Dixon, however, fails to draw critical
distinctions between § 2250(a)(2)(B) and the Mann Act: the Mann Act
explicitly requires that the movement of persons in interstate commerce be
with the specific intent to engage in prostitution.138
Conversely,
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) lacks either intent or temporal restrictions and simply
requires that the offender have traveled, at one time or another, in interstate
commerce.139 Section 2250(a)(2)(B) and the Mann Act are distinguishable,
because § 2250(a)(2)(B) regulates a far broader swath of conduct than does
the Mann Act.
2. Eighth Circuit Treatment: United States v. May and United States v.
Howell
In United States v. May,140 the Eighth Circuit considered whether
SORNA violated the Commerce Clause. The court held that 18 U.S.C.
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) was a permissible exercise of congressional commerce
authority.141 In so holding, the court found that SORNA "derives its
authority from each prong of Lopez and most specifically, the ability to
regulate ‘persons or things in interstate commerce’ and ‘the use of the
channels of interstate commerce.’"142
In sustaining the regulation under the first Lopez category, the court
pointed to its holding in United States v. Brooks143—"[i]t has long been
established that Congress may forbid or punish use of interstate commerce
as an agency to promote immorality or the spread of evil or harm to the
people of the states from the state of origin."144 When citing Brooks, the
137. Id.
138. See 18 U.S.C. § 2421. The statute states that:
Whoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate or foreign commerce,
on in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such
individual engage in prostitution, or any sexual activity for which any person
can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
Id. (emphasis added).
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) (regulating those sex offenders who "travel[] in
interstate commerce . . .").
140. United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2008).
141. See id. at 921–22 (holding that SORNA fits within the first two prongs of Lopez
and is a permissible exercise of congressional Commerce Clause authority).
142. Id. at 921.
143. United States v. Brooks, 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
144. May, 535 F.3d at 921 (quoting Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436 (1925)).
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Eighth Circuit failed to consider the scope of § 2250(a)(2)(B). Section
2250(a)(2)(B) does not penalize the travel of sex offenders. Rather, the
statue penalizes the sex offenders who, at one time or another, have traveled
in interstate commerce, and fail to register.145 If Congress intended to
forbid the "spread of evil or harm"146 it would have restricted the travel of
sex offenders; Congress, however, chose only to penalize an offender’s
failure to register.147
Attempting to fit SORNA into the third prong of Lopez, the court
emphasized that § 2250(a)(2)(B) contained the requisite "jurisdictional
hook."148 The court, however, failed to address any of the other Morrison
considerations (whether the activity being regulated is economic in nature,
whether legislative findings speak to the substantial effect on interstate
commerce, and whether the nexus between interstate commerce and the
activity being regulated is "attenuated").149 By treating the presence of the
jurisdictional element as dispositive, the court misapplied the holdings in
Lopez and Morrison. Although both courts indicated that the presence of a
jurisdictional element may be necessary to bring a regulated activity into
the realm of constitutionality, neither holding suggested that the mere
presence of a jurisdictional element would be sufficient.150 By striking
down the gender-motivated violence statute even though it contained
legislative fact finding, Morrison made clear that none of the four factors
are sufficient to a finding of constitutionality.151 Conversely, the Lopez
Court required that the jurisdictional element limit the reach of the
regulation to those activities that "have an explicit connection with or effect
on interstate commerce."152
145. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) (regulating those sex offenders who "travel[] in
interstate commerce and who fail to register their sex offender status").
146. May, 535 F. 3d at 921–22 (quoting Brooks, 267 U.S. at 436 (1925)).
147. Id.
148. See id. at 922 (noting that the neither the Gun-Free School Zones Act nor the
VAWA contained the necessary jurisdictional elements and that "SORNA includes an
express and clear jurisdictional element for individuals not convicted pursuant to federal
jurisdiction" (citations omitted)).
149. Id.
150. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("Although Lopez makes
clear that such a jurisdictional element would lend support to the argument that § 13981 is
sufficiently tied to interstate commerce, Congress elected to cast § 13981’s remedy over a
wider, and more purely intrastate, body of violent crime.").
151. See id. at 614 (stating "[s]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular
activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so" (citing
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (1995)).
152. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (noting that the Gun Free
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The Eighth Circuit again considered and rejected challenges to the
constitutionality of SORNA in United States v. Howell.153 Relying on
previously decided cases, the court quickly dismissed Commerce Clause
challenges to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B).154
Although § 16913 is outside of the scope of this Note, the in-depth analysis
and approach the court takes proves useful.155
Although the court eventually adopted a broad construction of the
congressional Commerce Clause powers, it conceded that, "a narrow
discussion which only analyzes § 16913 under the three categories of Lopez
casts doubt on the constitutionality of § 16913."156 The court highlighted
that § 16913 neither contains a jurisdictional element limiting the statute’s
scope nor is supported by evidence demonstrating that the registration
requirements substantially affects interstate commerce.157 Nevertheless the
court concluded that "the broad authority granted to Congress through both
the Commerce Clause and the enabling necessary and proper clause reveals
that the statute is constitutionally authorized."158
The Eighth Circuit looked to the "language, statutory scheme,
declaration of purpose, and legislative history" of SORNA to hold that that
the purpose, intent, and focus of SORNA is to regulate the interstate
movement of sex offenders.159 The court stated that § 16913 was a
reasonable "means," even if reaching a wholly intrastate sex offender, to
attain the legitimate "end" of regulating both the channels and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce.160 Therefore, the court reasoned
School Zones Act "has no express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a
discrete set of firearm possession that have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate
commerce").
153. 552 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2009).
154. See id. at 713 (stating that the Eighth Circuit has already ruled that § 2250 is
constitutional under the Commerce Clause and that it will adhere to its previous holding).
155. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 16913 (requiring that under subsection (a) sex offenders
register in each jurisdiction where they live, work or go to school and under subsection (c)
their registration must be updated within three days of changing place of residence, work or
school). Section 16913 contains no jurisdictional element and reaches purely intrastate
activity. Id.
156. Howell, 552 F.3d at 715.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 717.
160. See id. ("The registration requirements are reasonably adapted to the legitimate
end of regulating ‘persons or things in interstate commerce’ and ‘the use of the channels of
interstate commerce. Covering the registration of wholly interstate sex offenders is merely
incidental to Congress’s tracking of sex offenders in interstate commerce." (citations
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that because SORNA was interstate in focus and regulated the "transient
nature of sex offenders," the purpose or "end" of SORNA must be
legitimate.161 Accordingly the court reasoned that all means reasonably or
rationally related to this end are appropriate.162 These underlying
assumptions not only advance a broad reading of the stated purpose of
SORNA but also of congressional Commerce Clause powers.
3. Tenth Circuit Treatment: United States v. Hinkley and United States v.
Lawrance
On two separate occasions, the Tenth Circuit considered and upheld
the constitutionality of SORNA. In United States v. Hinkley, the court
found SORNA to be easily distinguishable from Lopez and Morrison.163
Citing May, the court found that SORNA fit into both the first and second
prongs of Lopez and held that "by requiring that a sex offender travel in
interstate commerce before finding a registration violation, SORNA
remains well within the constitutional boundaries of the Commerce
Clause."164
One day after the Hinkley opinion was issued, the Tenth Circuit again
upheld the constitutionality of SORNA in United States v. Lawrance.165
Judge Kelly thought it was irrelevant whether or not a sex offender’s failure
to register "substantially affected" interstate commerce; he held that
SORNA fit comfortably within the first two prongs of Lopez.166 In
rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge the court concluded, "SORNA
clearly intends to regulate interstate activity, i.e., the evasion of sex

omitted)); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413 (1819) ("Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.").
161. United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709, 717 (8th Cir. 2009).
162. See id. ("[A]ll means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional." (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413 (1819))).
163. See United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926, 940 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasizing
the presence of the jurisdictional element found in SORNA and absent from the GFSZA and
VAWA).
164. Id.
165. United States v. Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329 (2008).
166. Id. at 1337.
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offender registration requirements by offenders who have crossed
jurisdictional lines."167
Both Lawrance and Hinkley construe the scope of the Commerce
Clause in an unduly broad manner.168 The Tenth Circuit seems to conclude
that, because the first and second Lopez prongs have traditionally been
aimed at "keep[ing] the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral
and injurious uses," congressional regulation of sex offenders, a group of
individuals typically viewed as "immoral," is permissible.169 What the
Tenth Circuit fails to recognize, however, is that Congress has not restricted
the "travel" of offenders in interstate commerce.170 Congress subjects all
those who have been convicted of a sex offense in state court and who
have, either before or after their conviction, traveled in interstate commerce
to the requirements and penalties of § 2250(a)(2)(B).171 However, nothing
in either the language of § 2250(a)(2)(B) or the legislative history of
SORNA so much as implies that SORNA seeks to regulate the travel of
offenders so as to "keep the channels of interstate commerce free from
immoral and injurious uses."172 Rather, failing to register is the regulated
activity.173 If such a regulation were sustained, no meaningful limits on
congressional commerce authority would remain.
4. Eleventh Circuit Treatment: United States v. Ambert and United States
v. Powers
The first time that the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a constitutional
challenge to SORNA, the court ruled in favor of the defendant without

167. Id.
168. See, e.g., id. (affirming Congress’s right to regulate even the spread of evil if it
occurs through the channels of interstate commerce).
169. See id. (inferring that Congress may regulate sex offenders based on their spread
of harm and immorality between states (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964))).
170. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (requiring sex offenders who travel interstate to register
or update registration in order to avoid fines and imprisonment).
171. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B), (a)(3) ("Whoever . . . travels in interstate
commerce. . . and . . . knowingly fails to register . . . shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned . . . .").
172. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 256 (quoting Caminetti v. United States,
242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917)).
173. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(3) (fining or imprisoning sex offenders who knowingly
fail to register or update registration after traveling in interstate commerce).
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reaching the substantive constitutional issues.174 However, the Eleventh
Circuit subsequently considered and upheld the constitutionality of SORNA
in United States v. Ambert.175 In Ambert, the court focused on United States
v. Ballinger,176 in its decision.177 Ballinger upheld the constitutionality of a
statute that criminalized church-based arson where the "offense is in or
affects interstate or foreign commerce."178 The Ballinger court reasoned
that congressional power to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of
interstate commerce includes "the power to prohibit their use for harmful
purposes, even if the targeted harm itself occurs outside the flow of
commerce and is purely local in nature."179 Further, the court in Ballinger
noted that this power includes the "power to reach criminal conduct in
which the illegal acts ultimately occur intrastate, when the perpetrator uses
the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce to facilitate their
commission."180
Applying Ballinger, the court found that because § 2250(a)(2)(B)
contains the requisite jurisdictional element and focuses on offenders who
travel in interstate commerce, the "use of the channels and instrumentalities
of interstate commerce is necessarily part of the commission of the targeted
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2250."181 The court further reasoned that
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) is indistinguishable from either Ballinger or the Mann Act
and that § 2250(a)(2)(B) "does no more than employ Congress’ lawful

174. See United States v. Madera, 528 F.3d 852, 859 (11th. Cir. 2008) (holding that
"[b]ecause [defendant’s] indictment concerns his failure to register during the gap period
between SORNA’s enactment and the Attorney General’s retroactivity determination,
[defendant] cannot be prosecuted for violating SORNA during that time").
175. See United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1210 (11th. Cir. 2009) (finding that
§ 2250(a) "is a proper regulation falling under either of the first two Lopez categories
because it regulates both the use of channels of interstate commerce and the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce").
176. See United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1219, 1230 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(holding that Congress’s commerce authority includes the power to punish a church arsonist
who uses the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce).
177. See Ambert, 561 F.3d at 1210–11 ("This Court further explained the proper
boundaries of Congress’ ability to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce in United States v. Ballinger . . . .").
178. See id. at 1211 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 247(b) and recognizing that Congress has
used its power to enact similar statutes which prevent harmful action based on its ability to
control the channels and instrumentalities of commerce).
179. Id. (quoting Ballinger, 395 F.3d at 1226).
180. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Ballinger, 395 F.3d at 1226).
181. United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1211 (11th Cir. 2009).
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commerce power to prohibit the use of channels or instrumentalities of
commerce for harmful purposes."182
By stating that the "use of the channels and instrumentalities of
interstate commerce is necessarily part of the commission of the targeted
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2250,"183 the court plainly errs. As previously
discussed, § 2250(a)(2)(B) remains distinct from the Mann Act.184 Section
2250(a)(2)(B) merely requires that the sex offender travel in interstate
commerce.185 Conversely, the Mann Act requires that the travel in
interstate commerce be with "intent that such individual engage in
prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged
with a criminal offense . . . ."186 By including the intent restriction the
Mann Act regulates only that conduct directly related to interstate
commerce.
The statute upheld in Ballinger requires that the offense either be "in"
interstate commerce or "affect" interstate commerce.187 Although these
restrictions do not impose an explicit intent restriction, the connection
between the activity being regulated and interstate commerce must be
direct.188 In effect, the statute in Ballinger places temporal restrictions on
the connection between interstate commerce and the activity being
regulated. In no way does the statute purport to suggest that if an arsonist
had at one time traveled in interstate commerce that he would,
automatically and permanently, be subjected to federal regulation.
However, under § 2250(a)(2)(B), if an offender at any time before or after
the commission of the underlying crime has traveled in interstate
commerce, he is subject to the statutory requirements of SORNA.189
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See supra Part III.B.1 (finding that because the Mann Act requires that the travel
in interstate commerce be with the intent to commit a crime it is distinct from § 2250(a)).
185. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) ("[T]ravels in interstate or foreign commerce, or
enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian country . . . .").
186. See 18 U.S.C. § 2421 ("Whoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate
or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with intent that
such individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be
charged with a criminal offense . . . .").
187. See 18 U.S.C. § 247(b) (providing that "[t]he circumstances referred to in
subsection (a) are that the offense is in or affect interstate or foreign commerce").
188. See United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1219, 1228 n.5 (11th Cir. 2005)
("[Section] 247 contains an explicit requirement of an appropriate nexus with interest
commerce, so that church arson may be prosecuted only when ‘the offense is in or affects
interstate or foreign commerce.’" (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 247(b))).
189. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) ("(a) In general. —Whoever—(1) is required to
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Section 2250(a)(2)(B) does not require that the travel in interstate
commerce be for harmful purposes.190 By failing to require that the travel
in interstate commerce be in some way related to the offense,
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) is distinct from the statute upheld in Ballinger.
Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit expands the scope of both the first and
second Lopez categories.
In the most recent appellate court decision, the Eleventh Circuit
again upheld the constitutionality of SORNA. The Eleventh Circuit in
United States v. Powers,191 reversed a strong district court opinion.192
The district court found the failure to register statute to be criminal and
non-economic in nature, the jurisdictional element to be void of
substance and accordingly, and that § 2250(a)(2)(B) lacked the
necessary nexus to interstate commerce.193 The Eleventh Circuit
reiterated its holding in Ambert: "Ambert controls here. The district
court erred in dismissing the indictment against Powers on the ground
that SORNA exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce
Clause."194
C. Federal District Court Treatment of the Commerce Clause
Challenges to SORNA
A large number of district courts have considered Commerce
Clause challenges to SORNA.195 The vast majority of those courts find

register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act . . . (2)(B) travels in
interstate or foreign commerce, or enters or leaves, or resides in, Indian Country . . . .").
190. See id. (neglecting to include any language on harmful purpose).
191. See United States v. Powers, 562 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(holding the registration provisions of SORNA do not violate the Commerce Clause and fall
within Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce).
192. See id. ("The district court erred in dismissing the indictment against Powers on
the ground that SORNA exceeded Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.").
193. See United States v. Powers, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1336 (M.D. Fla. 2008) ("If an
individual’s mere unrelated travel in interstate commerce is sufficient to establish a
Commerce Clause nexus with purely local conduct, then virtually all criminal activity would
be subject to the power of the federal government.").
194. Id. at 1343.
195. See Corey Rayburn Yung, The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act and
the Commerce Clause, 21 FED. SENT’G. REP. 133, 134 (2008) [hereinafter The Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act and the Commerce Clause] ("As of October 12, 2008, at
least fifty-four district courts have issued opinions on a Commerce Clause challenge.").
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that SORNA falls within Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.196
Although the percentage of courts that have upheld the constitutionality
of SORNA is overwhelming, the underlying analysis for such
conclusions is often misapplied and varies widely.197
1. District Courts Finding that § 2250(a)(2)(B) Is a Permissible Exercise
of Congressional Commerce Clause Power
The majority of district courts have rejected Commerce Clause
challenges to § 2250(a)(2)(B) by finding that the activity being regulated
fits into the second Lopez prong—instrumentalities of commerce or persons
or things in interstate commerce.198 Analyzing the regulated activity under
the second Lopez category, the court in United States v. Ditomasso199 was
satisfied that the presence of the jurisdictional element in SORNA
adequately distinguished the statute in Lopez and Morrison and
accordingly, upheld the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B).200
In
supporting this conclusion, the court surmised that an activity being
regulated under the second Lopez category is required to be neither
economic in nature nor contain a specific element requiring that the
interstate travel be with the intent not to register.201
In United States v. Vardaro,202 the district court upheld the
constitutionality of SORNA relying on the second Lopez category.203 As
the majority of federal district courts have done, the Vardaro court
emphasized the presence of the jurisdictional element limiting SORNA
196. See id. at 134 ("Only three of those fifty-four opinions have found that SORNA
was not a proper exercise of federal power.").
197. See id. ("While courts have largely been consistent in rejecting Commerce Clause
challenges, the reasons offered and methodology employed have varied widely.").
198. See id. (relaying the fact that most courts have found SORNA justified under the
second prong of the Lopez analysis).
199. See United States v. Ditomasso, 552 F. Supp. 2d 233, 247 (D.R.I. 2008) (finding
§ 2250 a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
200. See id. at 245–46 (finding that § 2250(a) is "clearly constitutional" under the
second Lopez prong); see also id. at 246 (distinguishing Lopez and Morrison).
201. See id. at 246–47 (noting both that the Court in Lopez allowed Congress to
regulate "persons . . . in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities" and that defendant lacks the necessary legal authority demonstrating that
"intent is a necessary element of the second prong").
202. See United States v. Vardaro, 575 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1185 (D. Mont. 2008)
(upholding the constitutionality of SORNA under the second prong of the Lopez test).
203. Id.
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prosecutions to those who have traveled in interstate commerce.204 These
two cases serve only as two of the many examples of district courts
upholding the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B) under the second prong
of Lopez.205
Additionally, numerous federal district courts have analyzed and
upheld § 2250(a)(2)(B) under the third Lopez category. For example, in
United States v. Holt,206 the Southern District of Iowa concluded, "[a]
rational basis exists for concluding that the activity regulated by SORNA
substantially affects interstate commerce."207 Similarly, in United States v.
Madera,208 the district court sustained a § 2250(a)(2)(B) challenge under
the third Lopez prong and reasoned that Congress’s desire to track sex
offenders as they move between states satisfies the rational basis test
articulated in Raich.209
Of those courts striking down SORNA as an unconstitutional violation
of congressional Commerce Clause powers, many have done so without
specifically declaring § 2250(a)(2)(B) unconstitutional. Rather, these
courts have struck down SORNA by declaring unconstitutional the
registration provision codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16913.210 Courts have held
that, unlike § 2250(a)(2)(B), § 16913 neither contains the requisite
jurisdictional element nor regulates the channels or instrumentalities of
204. See id. at 1186 ("SORNA’s criminal provision at 18 U.S.C. § 2250 contains an
appropriate jurisdictional element which expressly limits SORNA prosecutions to those
individuals who have traveled in interstate commerce. [This shows] Congress was acutely
aware of the breadth of its power . . . .").
205. See 30 A.L.R. FED. 2d 213, supra note 54 (listing cases considering the
constitutionality and application of SORNA).
206. See United States v. Holt, No. 3:07-cr-0630-JAJ, 2008 WL 1776495, at *3 (S.D.
Iowa Apr. 14, 2008) (upholding the constitutionality of SORNA under the third Lopez prong
(citing United States v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005))).
207. Id.
208. See United States v. Madera, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2007)
(finding the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 constitutional).
209. See id. at 1265 ("This rational basis test [laid out in Raich] is clearly met through
Congress’s desire to track sex offenders as they move between states, in order to promote the
public safety.").
210. See, e.g., United States v. Waybright, 561 F. Supp. 2d. 1154, 1165 (D. Mont.
2008) (holding that though § 2250(a) is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause, § 16913 regulated all sex offenders regardless of whether they traveled in
interstate commerce and, therefore, was not a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause); United States v. Hall, 577 F. Supp. 2d 610, 623 (N.D.N.Y. 2008)
(holding that though § 2250(a) was constitutional under the Commerce Clause, § 16913 is
unconstitutional because it lacks a jurisdictional element and applies to all sex offenders
regardless of whether they travel in interstate commerce).
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interstate commerce.211 Consequently, most of these courts have dismissed
defendants’ indictments reasoning that "a conviction under § 2250(a) is
invalid because the criminal penalty statute demands the Government prove
the defendant was required to register under § 16913."212 However, while
the court in United States v. Thomas,213 concluded that § 16913 was an
impermissible exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power, it upheld
the indictment as valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause.214 The
position taken in Thomas is unique.215 With the exception of Thomas,
regardless of the statutory provision deemed unsustainable under commerce
authority, the effect is the same—the defendant’s indictment is dismissed.
2. District Courts Finding § 2250(a)(2)(B) to Be an Impermissible Exercise
of Congressional Commerce Clause Power
A growing minority of federal courts have found § 2250(a)(2)(B) to be
an impermissible exercise of congressional Commerce Clause powers.
Before being overturned by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Powers,
the district court held that § 2250(a)(2)(B) could not be justified under any
of the Lopez categories.216 Focusing its analysis on the third Lopez prong,
the court found that the statute was criminal in nature and did not deal with
commerce or any sort of economic enterprise.217 Powers opined that the
supposed "jurisdictional element" was naked, superficial, and did not bring
211. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 577 F. Supp. 2d 610, 620 (N.D.N.Y. 2008)
(finding that a conviction under § 16913 "raises greater constitutional concern than
§ 2250(a) because it lacks a jurisdictional element restricting its application to individuals
who travel in interstate commerce").
212. See id. at 622 (finding that the interrelatedness between § 2250 and § 16913
demands that neither be upheld under the Commerce Clause due to the lack of any
connection to interstate commerce in § 16913).
213. See United States v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922 (N.D. Iowa 2008) (holding
§ 16913 constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause).
214. See id. at 920–22 (broadening the application of § 16913 under the Necessary and
Proper Clause).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 582 F. Supp. 2d 305, 314 (N.D.N.Y. 2008)
(finding that §16913 is neither constitutional under the Commerce Clause nor a "reasonably
adapted means to achieve a constitutional objective" and, therefore, rejecting the Necessary
and Proper Clause argument accepted in Thomas).
216. See United States v. Powers, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1334–45 (M.D. Fla. 2008)
("Like the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison, SORNA has nothing to do with
commerce or any form of economic enterprise.").
217. See id. at 1335 ("SORNA has nothing to do with commerce or any form of
economic enterprise.").
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§ 2250(a)(2)(B) into the realm of constitutionality—the Commerce Clause
requires more than "statutory ‘lip service’ to interstate commerce."218 In so
reasoning, the court noted that "[i]f an individual’s mere unrelated travel in
interstate commerce is sufficient to establish a Commerce Clause nexus
with purely local conduct, then virtually all criminal activity would be
subject to the power of the federal government. Surely our founding fathers
did not contemplate such a broad view of federalism."219 Despite the sound
reasoning by this district court, the Eleventh Circuit, bound by its prior
holding in United States v. Ambert, reversed the district court and found
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) to be a permissible exercise of Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority.220
For the Southern District of Florida, Chief Judge Zloch, in United
States v. Myers,221 held that both § 16913 and § 2250(a)(2)(B) violated the
Commerce Clause.222 With regard to § 2250(a)(2)(B), the court concluded:
Contrary to Powers, the Court finds that by enacting § 2250 Congress
did not attempt to regulate an activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce. Rather, the statute’s language regulates sex offenders who
have traveled in interstate commerce. Congress, however, has no power
to regulate a person simply because at some earlier time he has traveled
in interstate commerce. Therefore . . . the Court will grant the instant
223
Motion To Dismiss Indictment . . . .

In so holding, the court focused on the first two Lopez prongs.
Looking at the first Lopez category, Chief Judge Zloch acknowledged that
Congress may regulate the channels of interstate commerce by
"criminalizing the travel of those who carry a proscribed intent or article"
but concluded that Congress "may not attach regulations on a person simply
because he has once innocently availed himself of his constitutional right
through the channels of interstate commerce."224 He reasoned that the first
218. Id.
219. Powers, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 1336; see also 30 A.L.R. FED. 2d. 213, supra note 54
(quoting Powers).
220. See United States v. Powers, 562 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding
§ 2250(a) to be a permissible exercise of congressional Commerce Clause authority).
221. See United States v. Myers, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1349–50 (S.D. Fla. 2008)
(holding that enactment of SORNA exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause powers and
defendant’s interstate travel did not have sufficient impact on interest commerce to permit
his prosecution).
222. See id. (holding that both § 16913 and § 2250(a) impermissibly exceed Congress’s
Commerce Clause powers).
223. Id. at 1317.
224. Id. at 1348.
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Lopez category permits Congress to regulate interstate commerce by
"barring from its channels a certain class of goods or people that it deems
harmful."225 The first Lopez prong operates to exclude those objects or
persons whose "movement across state lines [is] with the proscribed
purpose or status."226 The first Lopez category focuses on regulating the
actual movement through interstate commerce.227
Conversely, § 2250(a)(2)(B) focuses on criminalizing a sex offender’s
failure to register. The statute does not regulate the travel of sex offenders,
for it neither bars offenders from the use of the channels of interstate
commerce nor restricts their use by including an intent limitation.228
Finally, § 2250(a)(2)(B) fails to include a temporal restriction that limits an
offender’s period of federal regulation to those times in which he is "using"
or is "in" interstate commerce.229 By correctly placing emphasis on the
actual movement through the channels of interstate commerce, the court
properly rejected the argument that § 2250(a)(2)(B) regulated activity
pursuant to the first Lopez prong.230
The court then looked to the purpose and language of the second Lopez
prong. The language of the second prong reads, "Congress is empowered
to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come
only from intrastate activities."231 The Southern District of Florida found
that the purpose of the second Lopez category was to address "Congress’s
power to regulate and protect such persons from threats while traveling or
about to travel in interstate commerce."232 The second prong regulates the
"means of conveying people and goods across state lines."233 It does not
225. Id. at 1328 (citing United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 288–89 (3d Cir. 1996)
(Alito, J., dissenting)).
226. Id.
227. See id. ("By excluding certain persons from the channels of interstate commerce,
the focus of the prohibition is on the person or thing’s movement across state lines with the
proscribed purpose.").
228. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) (restricting only the manner in which the sex
offenders must register).
229. See id. (failing to include any time restrictions in the statute).
230. See United States v. Myers, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1349-50 (S.D. Fla. 2008)
(finding § 2250 "is in no way a regulation of persons in interstate commerce").
231. Id. at 1348 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558
(1995)).
232. Id. at 1329 (emphasis added).
233. Id. at 1341 (quoting United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 288–89 (Alito, J.,
dissenting)).
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operate to allow Congress to regulate any person who has, at one point or
another, traveled across state lines.234
Chief Judge Zloch correctly states that the courts which have relied on
the second Lopez category to sustain § 2250(a)(2)(B) "have interpreted the
phrase ‘persons in interstate commerce’ to give Congress plenary
jurisdiction over a person once he has traveled in interstate commerce."235
Rather than acquiescing to increased judicial justification of
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) under the second category, the Southern District of Florida
concludes that language and historical use of the second Lopez category "is
addressed to Congress’s power to regulate and protect such persons from
threats while traveling in interstate commerce. It involves things ‘actually
being moved in interstate commerce, not all people and things that have
ever moved across state lines.’"236 Applying this standard, the court
concludes that § 2250(a)(2)(B) impermissibly exceeds the scope of
congressional commerce authority.
IV. Evaluating Commerce Clause Challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B)
A. The Economic/Non-economic Distinction and the Appropriate Level of
Deference to Be Accorded Congressional Findings of Fact
1. Level of Deference Accorded to Congressional Fact-Finding in Recent
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
As a preliminary matter, one must consider the level of deference to be
accorded to congressional fact-finding. Breaking from prior Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, the Court in Lopez and Morrison omitted any explicit
reference to the amount of deference given to congressional fact-finding.237
234. See id. at 1329 (stating that regulation under the second Lopez category "does not
mean that once a person has traveled in interstate commerce a regulation is attached to
him").
235. United States v. Myers, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
236. Id. at 1348 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615,
622 (10th Cir. 2006)).
237. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 613 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)
("[Congressional findings] tell us what Congress actually has found, not what it could
rationally find. If, indeed, the Court were to make the existence of explicit congressional
findings dispositive in some close or difficult cases something other than rationality review
would be afoot."); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) ("[T]he
existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality
of Commerce Clause legislation.").
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Nonetheless, the Lopez decision implies some form of heightened judicial
review; Rehnquist appears to qualify rational basis review and to treat
"deference under the rationality rule as subject to gradation according to the
commercial or noncommercial nature of the immediate subject of the
challenged regulation."238 Additionally, Lopez implies that if Congress had
provided legislative findings regarding the effect on interstate commerce,
some increased deference to Congress might be entertained.239 By
announcing that the Court will independently evaluate constitutionality
under the Commerce Clause, the question was not whether Congress could
have rationally concluded that the Gun Free School Zones Act or the
Violence Against Women Act substantially affected interstate commerce,
but rather, whether those statutes actually had a substantial affect on
interstate commerce.240 In Morrison, the Court echoed Lopez, providing
that "whether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently
to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is
ultimately a judicial rather than legislative question, and can be settled
finally only by this Court."241
Conversely, the Court in Raich, by applying a rational basis level of
review, accorded Congress great deference.242 The Court distinguished
Lopez and Morrison by stating that the regulated activities in the earlier
cases were non-economic in nature and outside of the scope of

238. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
239. See id. at 562 (majority opinion) (citations omitted) ("Although as a part of our
independent evaluation of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause we of course
consider legislative findings, and indeed even congressional committee findings, regarding
effect on interstate commerce[.]"); but see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614–16
(2000) (rejecting Congress’s findings even though VAWA is supported by numerous
statistics regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims, and
noting that determining whether an activity contains the sufficient nexus to interstate
commerce is a judicial rather than legislative question).
240. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 ("But to the extent that congressional findings would
enable [the Court] to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question
substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was
visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.").
241. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (2000) (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added)
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 273 (1964)).
242. See United States v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2006) ("In assessing the scope of
Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause, we stress that the task before us is a
modest one. We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate,
substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for
so concluding.").
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congressional Commerce Clause power.243 Although the level of deference
accorded in Raich cannot be ignored, a narrow reading of Raich suggests
that the level of scrutiny applied to § 2250(a)(2)(B) turns on whether the
activity is commercial or non-commercial in nature.
2. Application of Appropriate Scrutiny to § 2250(a)(2)(B): The
Economic/Non-economic Distinction
No reading of the activity being regulated in § 2250(a)(2)(B) could
possibly suggest that "travel" in interstate commerce is "economic" or
"commercial in nature." In adopting an expansive construction of the term
"economic," the majority in Raich states "‘[e]conomics’ refers to ‘the
production, distribution and consumption of commodities.’"244 Section
2250(a)(2)(B) is criminal rather than economic in nature. Even this
expansive definition of economics cannot include creating a federal
criminal penalty for sex offenders who violate their registration
requirements. The stated purpose of SORNA is to protect the public from
sex offenders.245 In an effort to accomplish this goal, SORNA criminalizes
a convicted sex offender’s failure to register.246 According to the language
of Lopez and Morrison, neither the means (criminalizing the failure to
register) nor the larger end (public safety) can be considered economic in
nature.247 Any "costs of crime" or similar economic argument will be
deemed, as required by Lopez, "too attenuated."248
243. See id. at 25 ("Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated
by the CSA are quintessentially economic.").
244. Id. at 26 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720
(1966)).
245. See 42 U.S.C. § 16901 ("In order to protect the public from sex offenders and
offenders against children, and in response to the vicious attacks by violent predators against
the victims listed below, Congress in this chapter establishes a comprehensive national
system for the registration of those offenders.").
246. Id.
247. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (finding that simple gun
possession is not an economic activity because it "is not an essential part of a larger
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated"); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613
(2000) ("Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic
activity. . . . [T]hus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause
regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.").
248. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563–64 (rejecting the "costs of crime" argument as too
attenuated); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 ("We accordingly reject the argument that
Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that
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Like the GFSZA, § 2250(a)(2)(B) is a "criminal statute that by its
terms has nothing to do with commerce or any sort of economic
enterprise . . . ."249 Further, like the GFSZA, § 2250(a)(2)(B) "is not an
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated."250 Although § 2250(a)(2)(B) is a part of the Adam Walsh Act,
in no way can the federal failure to register provision as applied to
convicted state sex offenders be deemed "essential" to the survival of the
AWA. Accepting that § 2250(a)(2)(B) is akin to the non-economic
activities that were being regulated in Lopez and Morrison and distinct from
the "quintessentially economic" activity being regulated in Raich, courts
should apply the more searching level of judicial scrutiny utilized in Lopez
and Morrison. When analyzing the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B),
courts should focus on whether the activity actually possesses the requisite
nexus to interstate commerce, not whether Congress could have rationally
concluded that such a nexus exists.
B. Analyzing Potential Commerce Clause Arguments and § 2250(a)(2)(B)
Under the Three Lopez Prongs
As previously stated, the Supreme Court has "identified three broad
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce
power."251 Section 2250(a)(2)(B) has been analyzed primarily under the
second category, but has also been sustained under the third Lopez
category. The following discussion will consider which, if any, of the
Lopez categories can uphold the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B). This
Part concludes that none of the three permissible categories for regulation
can support the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B).
1. Congress’s Ability to Regulate the "Channels of Interstate Commerce"
First, "Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce."252 As of this writing, no Supreme Court jurisprudence defines
conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.").
249. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
250. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24 (2005).
251. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 276–77 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971)).
252. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
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the scope of congressional commerce authority under this category.253
Historically, however, Commerce Clause jurisprudence sustained
congressional regulations under this category in an effort to keep the
channels "‘free from immoral or injurious uses.’"254 In essence, the first
Lopez category allows Congress to "‘exclude from the commerce [those
things] whose use in the states for which they are destined it may conceive
to be injurious to public health, morals or welfare.’"255 In defining the
scope of this category, the Court in United States v. Caminenti,256 stated,
"[i]t may be conceded, for the purpose of this argument, that Congress has
no power to punish one who travels in interstate commerce merely because
he has the intention of committing an illegal or immoral act at the
conclusion of his journey . . . . It seeks to reach and punish the movement
in interstate commerce . . . ."257
Accepting Caminenti, the dispositive inquiry is what Congress
seeks to punish. Congress can regulate the channels of interstate
commerce so that their use is neither immoral nor injurious. To
accomplish this stated goal, Congress is free to regulate the travel or
actual movement of persons or things through the channels of interstate
commerce; however, Congress may not regulate immoral or injurious
conduct committed once the individual has reached his destination. If
Congress could regulate any individual who has ever, at one point in
his life, "used" the channels of interstate commerce, the Commerce
Clause would impose no meaningful constraints upon the powers of
the federal government.
The language of § 2250(a)(2)(B) regulates those sex offenders
who "travel[] in interstate commerce."258 Determining the activity that
is being regulated is pivotal to an analysis of the first Lopez category.
Here, the jurisdictional element purporting to furnish § 2250(a)(2)(B)
with the requisite nexus to interstate commerce does not criminalize or
253. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33–34 (2005) (summarizing Supreme Court
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and stating that "our cases have mechanically recited that
the Commerce Clause permits congressional regulation" of the channels of interstate
commerce, implying this category’s lack of definition (emphasis added)).
254. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (internal
quotations omitted).
255. United States v. Myers 591 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (quoting
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941)).
256. See generally Caminenti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (affirming two
appellate court decisions affirming convictions under the White Slave Traffic Act).
257. Id. at 491 (emphasis added).
258. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B).
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regulate the act of travel; rather the travel in interstate commerce is
"divorced from the criminal act of knowingly failing to register as a
sex offender."259 The jurisdictional element is regulatory in nature.
The jurisdictional element is merely an administrative regulation for
prosecuting individuals for failing to register and only requires that the
sex offender has traveled, at some undefined time, in interstate
commerce.260 The lack of any temporal or intent requirements attached
to the jurisdictional element demonstrates that Congress did not intend
to regulate the movement of sex offenders in interstate commerce as is
required under the first prong. Congress can regulate the channels of
interstate commerce by prohibiting persons with a proscribed intent
from traveling through the channels, but it cannot regulate the local
activity that the person partakes in once he has ceased traveling in
interstate commerce. Section 2250(a)(2)(B) cannot be sustained under
this first Lopez category.
2. Congress’s Ability to Regulate and Protect "the Instrumentalities of
Interstate Commerce, or Persons or Things in Interstate Commerce,
Even Though the Threat May Come from Only Intrastate Activities"
The second category, although wrongly relied on by a majority of
courts, does not justify the enactment of § 2250(a)(2)(B). The
language reads, "Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities."261 The issued opinions relying upon the second
Lopez category seem to suggest that once a person has traveled across
state lines, Congress is free to regulate that individual in any way it
sees fit. For example, the district court in Mason held that Congress is
empowered to "regulate those individuals or things that travel in
interstate commerce without regard to the reason for their

259. Myers, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 1348.
260. See id. at 1335 (finding that rather than containing any jurisdictional element, the
statute is a "blanket regulation falling upon all sex offenders, whether or not they have
traveled across state lines or whether or not they undertake any action related to interstate
commerce").
261. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
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movement."262 As the court in United States v. Myers suggests, this
construction is unduly broad.263
Although the jurisdictional element found in § 2250(a)(2)(B)
technically makes a sex offender a "person . . . in interstate
commerce," this seeming compliance is not sufficient. Particularly
important is the complete lack of temporality associated with the
jurisdictional element. By failing to either include a temporality or
intent restriction, the nexus between failing to register and the activity
being regulated disappears.
An intent restriction would limit
regulation to those sex offenders who traveled across state lines with
the intent to evade registration requirements. Similarly, a temporal
restriction would limit regulation to those sex offenders whose travel
in interstate commerce was contemporaneous with their failure to
register. Both temporal and intent restrictions would serve to create
the necessary nexus between interstate commerce and the activity
being regulated—the failure to register.
In addition to the lack of any temporal or intent-based element,
reading the second Lopez category in totality rather than in isolation
reveals that § 2250(a)(2)(B) does not fit into the second category.
Gibbs v. Babbitt,264 a Fourth Circuit case speaking to Congress’s power
under this second Lopez category, is illustrative.265 In Gibbs, the
Fourth Circuit stated that, although the red wolves in question had
been transported through interstate commerce, that alone is not
sufficient to make them a "thing" in interstate commerce.266
Analogously, although the sex offenders have traveled in interstate
commerce, that alone should not be enough to make them "persons" in
interstate commerce. In sum, "[t]his category, as evidenced by the
cases cited as exemplars, consists of Congress’s power over the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, like planes and trains.
Section 2250 does not concern such instrumentalities of interstate
262. United States v. Mason, 510 F. Supp. 2d 923, 932 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
263. See United States v. Myers, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2008) ("By
articulating the categories in Lopez, the Supreme Court did not create new powers for
Congress beyond those it traditionally enjoyed. It simply formulated a convenient rhetorical
tool for lower courts and practitioners alike to quickly identify the historically accepted
forms of Congress’s Commerce Clause power." (internal citation omitted)).
264. See Gibbs v. Babbit, 214 F.3d 483, 506 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a regulation
limiting the taking of wolves on private land was valid under the Commerce Clause).
265. See id. at 491 (declining to find that wolves that have been transported through
interstate commerce constitute a "thing" within interstate commerce).
266. Id.
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commerce or the carriage of persons on such instrumentalities." 267
Section 2250(a)(2)(B) does not implicate the second Lopez prong.
3. Congress’s Ability to Regulate Those Things that Have a "Substantial
Effect" on Interstate Commerce
An analysis under the third Lopez category proves similarly
problematic. The Court in Morrison articulated four factors speaking to
whether a regulated activity has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.268 With regard to this third category, Morrison directs courts to
consider: (1) whether the activity being regulated is commercial or
economic in nature; (2) whether the statute contains a jurisdictional element
to limit its scope; (3) whether congressional findings reflect effects upon
interstate commerce; and (4) whether the nexus of link between the activity
being regulated and interstate commerce is attenuated.269 Applying these
four factors, § 2250(a)(2)(B) cannot be said to have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.
First, as discussed in Part III (A)(2), the activity being regulated is not
economic in nature.270 Although finding that criminalizing the failure to
register is "non-economic" does not per se bring the statute outside of the
realm of constitutionality, the Court disfavors aggregation of the individual
instances of non-economic conduct.271 In disallowing the aggregation of
the individual incidents of conduct, the Morrison Court states: "While we
need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any
noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation’s
history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate
activity only where that activity is economic in nature."272 The above
excerpt articulates that the Court not only strongly disapproves of the
aggregation of individual instances of conduct, but also that no regulation
of a non-economic intrastate activity has ever been sustained.

267. United States v. Myers, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
268. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610–12 (2000).
269. Id.
270. Supra Part III.A.2 and accompanying notes and text.
271. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (finding it dispositive that "[g]ender-motivated
crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity").
272. Id.
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Separation of powers underlies this result.273 Allowing the aggregation
of individual instances of non-economic conduct would undermine the
police power reserved to the states. Justice Thomas reasoned, "we always
have rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal
power that would permit Congress to exercise a police power[.]"274
Rationalizing that, in the aggregate, a sex offender’s failure to register has a
substantial affect on interstate commerce would, undeniably, allow
Congress to exercise a police power.
Second, although § 2250(a)(2)(B) contains an express jurisdictional
element, the jurisdictional element is insufficient; the jurisdictional element
regulates far too broad a swath of conduct.275 Morrison requires that the
jurisdictional element either: (a) limit the reach of the statute to the conduct
that has an "explicit connection with or effect on, interstate commerce," or
(b) that the jurisdictional element "establish that the enactment is in
pursuance of Congress’s regulation of interstate commerce."276 As
suggested by the Middle District of Florida in United States v. Powers,277
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) neither limits the reach of the failure to register provision
to those offenders with an explicit connection to, or effect on, interstate
commerce, nor establishes that § 2250(a)(2)(B) is pursuant to Congress’s
power to regulate commerce.278 First, lacking the necessary intent and
temporal requirements, the jurisdictional element can hardly be considered
limiting—those offenders who have traveled at any time and for any reason
in interstate commerce are subjected § 2250(a)(2)(B).279 Second, in no way
273. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (finding that the
Constitution requires "a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local"
(internal citations omitted)).
274. Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
275. See, e.g., The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act and the Commerce
Clause, supra note 195, at 136 ("The limits [of the jurisdictional element] must correspond
with the scope of the Commerce Clause. Congress cannot merely include the magic words
‘interstate commerce’ (which it did not even do in SORNA) and expend the limit to be
adequate.").
276. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611–12 (2000).
277. United States v. Powers, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
278. See id. at 1335 (stating that the jurisdictional element in § 2250(a)(2)(B) neither
limits the reach of the statute to that conduct which has an explicit connection with or effect
on interstate commerce nor establishes that the statute is in pursuance of congressional
power to regulate interstate commerce).
279. See The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act and the Commerce Clause,
supra note 195, at 136 ("In the case of § 2250(a)(2)(B), the jurisdictional language is
insufficient because it includes no temporal connection between travel and failing to register,
and prior travel does not inherently have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.").
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can regulating all offenders who have, at one point or another, traveled in
interstate commerce substantially affect interstate commerce.280 The
jurisdictional element fails to furnish the necessary ties or nexus between an
offender’s failing to register and interstate travel.281 A jurisdictional
element must not be naked or superficial; a jurisdictional element must be
more than "statutory lip service"; merely including the words "who have
traveled in interstate commerce" does not satisfy the demands of the
Commerce Clause.282 Third, "SORNA’s legislative history lacks any clear
congressional findings concerning the effect of sex offender registration
Congress’s failure to include any
upon interstate commerce."283
congressional findings assessing the relationship between a sex offender’s
failure to register and interstate commerce lends further support for the
notion that § 2250(a)(2)(B) impermissibly exceeds the scope of
congressional authority pursuant to the Commerce Clause.284 Finally, the
fourth Morrison consideration asks courts to consider whether the link
between that which is being regulated and the effect on commerce is
attenuated.285
As discussed with respect to the second Morrison
consideration, by failing to include either intent or temporal restrictions,
Congress cannot rationally claim that criminalizing a sex offenders’ failure
to register under § 2250(a)(2)(B) has more than an attenuated nexus to
interstate commerce.286

280. See Powers, 544 F. Supp. 2d. at 1335 (internal quotations omitted) ("The mere fact
that the individual has, at some point, traveled in interstate commerce does not establish that
his or her subsequent failure to register substantially affects interstate commerce").
281. See id. ("[Section] 2250(a) does contain a ‘jurisdictional element’ which purports
to establish a link between the failure to register as a sex offender and interstate
commerce . . . this supposed link is superficial and insufficient to support a finding of
substantial affect on interstate commerce.").
282. See id. ("[T]his supposed link is superficial . . . [t]he Commerce
Clause . . . require[s] more than statutory lip service to interstate commerce . . . [t]he mere
fact that the individual has, at some point, traveled in interstate commerce does not establish
that . . . [he] substantially affects interstate commerce.").
283. United States v. Guzman, 582 F. Supp. 2d 305, 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2008).
284. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000) ("While Congress
normally is not required to make formal findings . . . the existence of such findings may
enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially
affect[s] interstate commerce." (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
285. See id. ("Finally, our decision in Lopez rested in part on the fact that the link
between gun possession and a substantial effect on interstate commerce was attenuated.").
286. The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act and the Commerce Clause,
supra note 279 and accompanying text.
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In no meaningful way can § 2250(a)(2)(B) be considered an economic
activity.287 The relationship between criminalizing a sex offender’s failure
to register and commerce is in no way direct. Because § 2250(a)(2)(B) is
non-economic in nature, the individual instances of conduct cannot be
aggregated when determining whether substantial effect on interstate
commerce exists.288 Each individual instance of conduct must substantially
affect interstate commerce.289 Even if a court were to apply a rational basis
level of review, § 2250(a)(2)(B) cannot be sustained under the third Lopez
category.
V. Conclusion
Although all four circuit courts reaching the substantive issue have
upheld the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B), a careful examination of
existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence intimates the opposite conclusion.
When considering the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B), courts should
engage in more than a perfunctory, result-oriented analysis. Increased
judicial approval of § 2250(a)(2)(B) not only exposes sex offenders to the
unduly burdensome and disproportional failure to register penalties but
also, "signal[s] an important shift in what the Lopez Court called the
‘sensitive relation between federal state and state jurisdiction.’"290 Even
after its decision in Raich, it seems that if the Court were to uphold
§ 2250(a)(2)(B) as a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause
powers, it would have to overturn Lopez and Morrison. Stare decisis and a
faithful interpretation of the Constitution should prohibit this result.
Commerce Clause jurisprudence concludes that the Court should apply
rational basis review for most economic Commerce Clause cases.291
However, Lopez and Morrison suggest that when legislation affects
287. Supra Part IV.A.2.
288. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 ("We accordingly reject the argument that Congress
may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s
aggregate effect on interstate commerce.").
289. See id. at 613 ("While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the
effects of noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation’s
history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of interstate activity only where
that activity is economic in nature.").
290. Logan, Sex Offender Registration, supra note 16, at 9.
291. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1964)("[W]here we find that
the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for
finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our
investigation is at an end.").
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individual’s rights, the Court should give less deference to Congress. The
level of review turns on whether the legislation is economic in nature. Even
accepting the broad definition of "economic" employed in Raich, in no way
can § 2250(a)(2)(B) be considered economic or commercial in nature.
Therefore, when considering the constitutionality of § 2250(a)(2)(B), the
Court should apply a more searching level of review. Considering, as the
Court did in Lopez and Morrison, whether § 2250(a)(2)(B) actually falls
within the purview of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers requires a
court to find that the legislation is unconstitutional.292 Any meaningful
Commerce Clause analysis reveals that § 2250(a)(2)(B) regulates neither
the channels nor the instrumentalities of commerce. Finally, any argument
that § 2250(a)(2)(B) has a substantial affect on interstate commerce is
simply too attenuated. Even the most expansive constructions of
congressional commerce authority recognize that this power is subject to
outer limits.293 Although these limits undeniably shift with time, extending
commerce authority to § 2250(a)(2)(B) signals an unprecedented expansion
of Congress’s commerce authority. Rather than employing a prudential or
consequential method of constitutional interpretation, courts should look to
the judicial decisions defining the text of the Commerce Clause. Faithfully
applying the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence directs the conclusion
that Congress overreached its commerce authority.

292. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000) ("[W]e conclude that the
Commerce Clause does not provide Congress with authority to enact [the statute at issue]."),
and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) ("The statute before us upsets the
federal balance to a degree that renders it an unconstitutional assertion of the commerce
power.").
293. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556–57 (1995) (articulating that the
Commerce Clause has always been subject to constraints and outer limits).

